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Abstract. There is no controversy in psychology or brain sciences that brains create 
mind and consciousness. Doubts and opinions to the contrary are quite frequently 
expressed in non-scientific publications. In particular the idea that conscious mind 
is received, rather than created by the brain, is quite often used against “materialistic” 
understanding of consciousness. I summarize here arguments against such position, 
show that neuroscience gives coherent view of mind and consciousness, and that this 
view is intrinsically non-materialistic. 
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Introduction
In recent decades molecular biology, neuroscience and cognitive sciences 
have made great progress in unravelling the mysteries of life, understanding 
how organisms function and control their behavior. Already at the end 
of the 19th century dualistic explanation placing soul that animates the 
body as the center of cognition has been abandoned in scientific literature. 
Why minds cannot be received, but are created by brains
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In philosophical literature the psycho-physical problem is still a matter 
of discussion and speculation, but cognitive sciences, including psychol-
ogy, neuroscience, artificial intelligence and the science of consciousness 
(Dehaene 2014) have verified many hypothesis unraveling the mechanisms 
of mental life. 
Understanding how embodiment and the ability to act in the world 
has facilitated specific forms of cognition, how dynamic interactions with 
environment shapes cognition, is fairly recent. Emergent self-organized 
complex systems arise from interactions of simple elements, leading to 
qualitatively new forms of organization and interaction. Cognitive systems 
do not receive passively information from their environment but actively 
enact it, in this way transforming their environment and generating in-
trinsic meaning. Systems of sufficient complexity create models of their 
environment and the self as agent, increasing the chances of survival by 
predicting the results of their own actions. 
Many animals have brains that are sufficiently complex to allow for 
imagery and representation of the self. Human brains, with greatly expanded 
association cortex, are capable of creating rich mental models of the world, 
self and other minds, understanding intentions of humans and animals. 
Awareness based on perception, attention and reaction to environmental 
events is omnipresent in animal kingdom and has already been implemented 
in robots (Edelman 2006, 2007; Cruse H. & Schilling M. 2015). Social animals 
need sophisticated communication. Human brains have sufficient power 
to develop the ability to comment on the state of their internal models 
(perceptions, associations, thoughts) using rich symbolic language. Without 
such language internal narration describing the stream of mental events 
is quite poor. The behavioral reactions of animals reflect their mental 
processes, such as reading intentions and anticipation of actions of other 
animals, planning coordinated actions during hunting. Motor activity of dogs 
in sleep seems to be a result of dreams. In the brains of animals neuronal 
space available for association and self-reflection is limited, but many 
mammals and even birds have complex social life, and primates develop 
sense of justice and unique cultures (de Waal 1996, 2005). 
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Scientific ideas are difficult to comprehend without proper education. 
Traditional explanation of mind as “a ghost in the machine” is much simpler, 
intuitively compelling and deeply entrenched in our culture. There are 
good evolutionary reasons for this situation (Bering 2006). They do not 
give any understanding of specific issues, cannot be verified, but for most 
people are satisfactory. Mental processes are qualitatively quite different 
from physical processes, but qualitative differences are frequently seen in 
science as different facets of the same phenomenon. Two explosive gases 
mixed together make water with completely different properties. Images on 
game console screen, sounds of personal assistant produced by smartphones, 
are qualitatively different than currents or voltages flowing through the 
integrated circuits, but images and sounds that carry rich information are 
just another interpretation of the activity of electronic systems. The same 
information may also take form of electromagnetic waves, passed from 
the satellite. Expression of this information needs physical system that 
can change it into signals stimulating our senses (or directly our brains). 
Mental states are qualitatively different than neural activity of the brain, 
but they are just another interpretation of neurodynamics. Expression of 
these states requires body movements, gestures, speech. 
In this paper I will summarize arguments that show why mind cannot 
be received from external sources. Next I shall discuss relations between 
matter, form and information, introducing the concept of dynamical form. 
A short discussion on relation of our current knowledge to traditional ideas 
closes this paper. 
1. Baggage of the antiquity
The need to understand the world, explain observations and predict what 
will happen, led to development of language and creation of mental models. 
Concepts were gradually introduced, from simple symbol designating 
objects and actions, to metaphors helping to explain some phenomena and 
understand intentions. Concepts that initially referred to concrete objects, 
for example the Greek word anemos, that initially meant wind or breath, 
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started to signify an abstract idea of animation, and were later reified into 
an abstract concept of anima, or the essence of life. Aristotle in De anima 
(2016) writes that psyche comes from respiration and refrigeration (katapsyxis 
in Greek). The history of such concepts is long, it may be linked to earlier 
ideas developed by Egyptian, Sumerian, Indian and other cultures. They 
had a clear explanatory function. Matter does not move by itself, there 
must be a mover inside. In Aristotle time the concept of the soul was well 
established. In his treatise De anima he mentions earlier ideas of Democritus, 
Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, Plato and several other early Greek philosophers. 
For him “the soul is in some sense the principle of animal life”, so the study 
of the soul “must fall within the science of nature”. Many ideas discussed 
in ancient works seem rather strange to scientists today. Some ideas that 
were discussed in Aristotle times seemed unreasonable to him, for example 
the soul as a self-moving number. His conclusion is that souls are needed 
to distinguish objects that are capable of living, performing their natural 
functions (seeds, fruits, animal bodies), from those that are unable to do it. 
Moreover, since various “powers” or functions of living things are different it 
makes sense to categorize souls according to at least three powers: nutritive 
(vegetative), sensitive and rational (Aristotle 2016). 
Aristotle saw the need for explanation of what makes the living thing 
alive, what unifies the elements of the body, and allows them to function. 
There must be something in addition to the matter that animates it, and 
this animating principle was at his time called soul. Is it just the special 
form of the matter, or is it something in addition to the matter? The animal 
body changes from birth to death, but life force is present. The simplest 
explanation is that souls of animals and humans continue to animate the 
body, but are inseparable from the body. Aristotle rejected the idea of 
souls independent of the body opting for a holistic idea that is known as 
hylomorphism. Living things are composed of matter, but it has a complex 
form. They are alive as long as this form is not significantly damaged. 
Specific form makes activity of things, animals and people possible, so 
form is their soul. 
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Hylomorphism has been embraced by theologians, especially in Thomas 
Aquinas tradition. The idea of form as the essence of life can be extended 
to dynamical forms, and reconciled with neuroscience’s view of the mind. 
Current research on consciousness has reviewed many speculations related 
to the mind-body relation, including quantum processes, panpsychism, 
nonreductive naturalistic dualism and many others. The idea that brain 
matter needs some external guidance to explain mental processes has not 
yet been universally rejected in philosophy, although the only progress in 
understanding minds has been done in cognitive sciences. There seems to be 
a general agreement that some brain functions, such as perception, attention, 
sensorimotor actions, are brain functions that are explained in details by 
neuroscience. We understand these functions and have implemented some 
of them in robots (Edelman 2006, 2007). The controversy has focused on 
conscious mental states and creation of subjective experience. Here the idea 
that conscious mind is received by the brains is still discussed. For example, 
John Eccles and Karl Popper wrote: “…we have to recognize that we are 
spiritual beings with souls existing in a spiritual world as well as material 
beings with bodies and brains existing in a material world” (Eccles & Popper 
1989, 241). To explain how souls interact with brains Eccles has proposed 
a strange quantum hypothesis of “psychons”. Search for the soul at the 
quantum level continues (Beauregard & O’Leary 2007). Such approaches do 
not try to explain facts known from cognitive psychology or neurosciences. 
Internet search for “brain as a receiver of consciousness” shows thousands 
of web pages that make such claims, although they are rarely published in 
scientific journals (Sleutjes et al. 2014). 
Stories invoked to sustain dualistic ideas are connected to the near-death 
experiences (NDE). Exiting body, seeing it from above, moving to other places 
during the cardiac arrest period and other such reports have anecdotal status. 
Attempts to verify that the out-of-body experiences reported by people that 
were resuscitated are real led to a large scale AWARE (AWAreness during 
REsuscitation) project, lasting 4 years. 15 medical centers were involcd and 
over 2000 cases have been examined. Review of the results (Parnia 2014) 
has not confirmed reality of these experiences, not a single subject has read 
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the writings that could be seen only from above in the emergency room. 
Claims that there was no brain activity or EEG signal was flat are not based 
on proper measurements. The lack of signals from a single central EEG 
electrode is not an indication that there is no activity in the whole brain, 
especially in temporal lobes and hippocampus that may store auditory 
information. It is impossible to use any neuroimaging technique under 
resuscitation conditions, as the setting up of equipment takes a long time. 
Residual brain activity, although not conscious, may allow for storing some 
information that is later re-lived and attributed to the time of resuscitation. 
Illusions of being outside own body, having additional limbs or virtual body 
of different sizes, being invisible, can be artificially induced. It is a fascinating 
area of research in neuroscience (see for example work done in H. Ehrsson 
laboratory, http://www.ehrssonlab.se). 
2. Consciousness as a function of the brain
Claims that “mind” or “consciousness” is received by the brain from some 
external source – called here mind or soul – have not defined precisely 
which functions of the mind or consciousness are received. The vegetative or 
responsive faculties are rather noncontroversial, there is nothing to receive. 
The rational soul has been equated by Aquinas with mind and intellect: 
…the principle of intellectual operation which we call the soul …We must 
conclude, therefore, that the human soul, which is called the intellect or the 
mind, is something incorporeal and subsistent. (Summa Theologica I, q. 75, a. 2)
It does not make sense to look for spiritual souls, intellect or mind as 
received, not created by the brain. Some arguments that are against such 
dualistic understanding are listed below. I shall use the word mind for mental 
processes in hylomorphic sense, and soul in dualistic sense. I shall use the 
concept of Self to signify all mental processes that I may be conscious of 
linked to the ideas about me and my relations with the world. 
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2.1. Complexity of brains
Everything in biology at molecular and cellular level is incredibly complex. 
These complex processes in worms or insects produce relatively simple 
functions allowing for feeding and reproduction. Ticks will wait for months on 
grass or leaves for their victim. Their behavior is fairly simple but is supported 
by great complexity of insect organism, genetic, biochemical and neural 
processes. Human brains have the most complex structures in the known 
Universe, enabling complex mental states (Bassett and Gazzaniga 2011). 
Human behavior results from changes in our biological organism, formation 
of trillion connections between almost 100 billion neurons and functional 
synchronization of all cells in the organism. Precise control of brains, 
needed for conscious experience, would require even higher complexity of 
the controlling entity. Moreover, since embodiment and interaction with the 
world is necessary to form new connections in the brain the information flow 
between the brain and the soul would have to be enormous. Our thinking and 
experience is directed towards physical environment and social relations. 
Souls in their own realm would have to learn all about this world to be able 
to transmit anything relevant to our activity and experience. 
Human organism contains about 50 trillion cells, with about two meters 
of DNA chain in each cell. The total length of DNA in our body is about 100 
billion km or 666 larger than the distance to the Sun. Bacteria, viruses, fungi, 
archaea and other microbes outnumber the body cells. In the central nervous 
system 100 billion neurons are connected by a quadrillion of synapses. A few 
million of new connections between neurons are formed in each second 
during the first years of life, linking different brain areas. Their growth is 
controlled by neurotrophic factors but sensory stimulation (including motor 
proprioception) is need to facilitate correct structure and function. Each 
cell contains 10 billion protein molecules, and more than 500.000 types 
of proteins are known. Organism is not a fixed structure, it is an evolving 
process, and it needs to interact with incredibly complex ecosystem, from 
bacteria and other microorganisms to plants and animals. Some cells die 
after only 4 days (for example gut cells), but other cells (neurons) may live 
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for 100 years, helping to preserve long-term memory and contributing to 
the feeling of personal identity.
Mental and biological processes are supported by huge complexity 
of brains and bodies, substrates in which complex minds and bodies may 
arise, if conditions are right. Evolutionary biology provides a framework 
in which environment through genetic selection creates a specific form 
of the body and of the mind, including representation of the Self. The 
body with the brain that has a great potential or development is born, but 
the Self is formed over the years, starting from simple inborn reflexes, to 
development of perception, language, the theory of mind and the ability 
for moral reasoning. I could have not been born at another time in history 
or in another country. A child born in China, even from the same parents, 
would develop quite different Self. Some character traits that are due to the 
genetic factors could be similar, but the view of the world, value system, the 
feeling of personal identity in relation to other people would reflect local 
culture, and so personal identity would be different.
Individual identity is closely related to experience and memory encoded 
in the substrate of brain matter. Only a very small percentage of brain pro-
cesses are consciously accessible and may be perceived at the mental level. 
Regulation of life processes in such complex organism is done by homeostatic 
mechanisms that are not accessible to the conscious Self. The Self is not able 
to control cell growth, homeostasis or neural processes required to make the 
simplest movement. Neuronal activity changes very rapidly synchronizing 
multiple cortical and subcortical brain areas. The brain has learned to label 
(assign words) activation that happens repeatedly, and these labels are used 
for communication, pointing to the events and objects in the world, or to 
internal states (imagery, thoughts). Inner perception includes emotional 
value associated with mental states. According to the “radical plasticity” 
hypothesis of Cleeremans (2011) brains learn to be conscious, predicting 
their own internal activity as well as the consequences of external actions 
on the world and on other agents. 
Comparing to complexity of brain processes mental processes are 
rather simple. Behind each conscious decision, each thought or gesture, 
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large synchronized activity of the most complex machinery imaginable 
is hidden. Mind-brain relations, or subjective-objective perspectives on 
human behavior, may be summarized in a metaphor: Mind is a shadow 
of neurodynamics (Duch, 2012). Neural activity may be measured using 
various techniques: EEG, MEG, NIRS, PET, fMRI, while mental events are 
represented by qualities recognized in the inner experience. Sometimes 
this experience is hard to describe, for example in the unusual brains states 
(in dreams, illusions, psychoactive drugs, or direct brain stimulation), or 
in situations when the brain has not yet learned how to interpret new 
experiences (Schwitzgabel, 2011). 
Brains support minds because their structure has enormous complexity. 
Chips in computers and smartphones contain billions of elements and 
therefore enable many complex functions. They are “dead” when the energy 
source (battery) is disconnected and spring to life when energy is supplied. 
Electronic devices need power supply to function, but their “soul” is in their 
whole organization, connection structure, memorized programs and data. 
Brains also need energy to function, but the essence of their identity is in 
their complex structure that is learned from individual experiences (Bassett 
and Gazzaniga 2011). Learning is reflected in mental processes; new ideas 
are grasped with considerable effort that cannot be explained by reception 
of some processes. 
If human brains were controlled receiving behavioral instructions from 
souls they would have to be even more complex than the brain/organism 
itself. Ability to survive would then depend on soul detailed knowledge of 
the physical world. The world of souls would have to contain the physical 
world to allow for learning. Imagine people living in the hunters/gatherers 
society who need to learn how to recognize, find and prepare for food 
hundreds of plants, seeds, roots, mushrooms. They must use all their senses 
and be aware of their actions to learn all skills needed for survival. It does 
not seem conceivable that such people make correct decisions guided by 
received conscious processes. Mental states are correlated with the brain 
states as can be seen in neuroimaging, and it is not possible to separate them, 
they are two sides of the same coin. If that interaction was local, like in the 
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radio or TV receiver, where the signal from the antenna has to be amplified 
and used to create sounds and pictures, then some designated part of the 
brain would have to initiate the activity. However, there is no part of the 
brain where thinking or decision processes start, linear causality does not 
apply to network systems where collective states arise. The whole brain is 
engaged in semantic interpretation of sensory data, associations and memory 
recall. An alternative would be a two-way interaction with the whole cortex, 
large number of brain nuclei and some parts of the autonomous nervous 
system in the body. That would lead to a massive flow of information that 
would be hard to miss. Activity of each part of the brain is explained by the 
global interaction of local activations from other parts. There is no place 
for external driving forces here. 
Brains working on solving hard problems use more glucose (as seen in 
PET imaging) and oxygen (as seen in fMRI signals). Receiver does not have 
to work harder to decide how to move a chess figure, but brains solving such 
problems have to do a lot of search, evaluating board positions and recalling 
memorized patterns that guide the search process. This is done largely at 
the unconscious level. Performing mental tasks that are well trained engages 
only a few brain areas, while performing novel tasks requires cooperation of 
the whole-brain network. A lot of research has shown that symbolic search 
and more recently pattern-based search in neural networks is a good model 
of brain processes that are responsible for thinking and problem solving. Two 
pioneers of artificial intelligence and cognitive sciences, Allen Newell and 
Herbert Simon, published in 1976 a paper “Computer Science as Empirical 
Inquiry: Symbols and Search”, that has defined physical symbolic systems 
as the basis for cognitive modeling. Ten years later this approach has been 
expanded to connectionist systems that use neural patterns as physical 
symbols (Rumelhart and McClelland, 1986). 
2.2. No function for souls
In ancient times souls had precise functions: animation. Thomas Aquinas 
followed Aristotle postulating three kinds of souls for different types of 
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movements. We have no problems understanding plant growth, explained 
by topobiology, and sensory-motor animal behavior. There is no more need 
for animation than in case of explosive chemical reactions. 
If brain is a receiver of consciousness then what exactly is it receiving? 
Not the information that comes from senses or that is recalled from episodic 
memory. I am aware of sounds because my auditory cortex reacts to stimuli 
coming from the auditory nerves. Sounds are changed to neural impulses 
and decomposed into pitch, timbre, rhythm, or speech-specific reactions. 
There is nothing missing in this process, nothing for souls to do. I can 
recognize melodies, name the objects in front of me, because there is a flow 
of neural information to the recognition memory and a link with motor 
cortex storing phonological labels for brain activations. Processing steps 
from retina to inferior temporal cortex to speech areas are unraveled with 
growing number of details, and this knowledge is used as inspiration by 
computer vision systems. 
Various forms of agnosia and anomia result from damages to the specific 
brain areas and processing pathways, and can be understood in terms of 
information processing by different brain areas. Visual and auditory illusions 
arise due to the extraction of specific information defining shapes, colors 
and movement. Activity of neurons in the primary visual cortex (V1) is only 
weakly correlated (about 10%) with the signals from retina, saving brain 
processing power. Top down connections from the higher brain areas provide 
the missing information – to see and to have visual experiences one has 
to learn in the early childhood what is there to see. This is why millions of 
connections are formed at each second in the first few years of infant’s life. 
Senses do not provide sufficient information for rich and detailed visual 
experiences; the expectations that have been learned are crucial. People 
who recover from blindness initially are not able to correlate their tactile 
experiences with what they see, but learn it within days or weeks. However, 
they experience simple illusions, such as Ponzo and Müller-Lyer, right after 
regaining sight (Gandhi et al. 2015). This is a result of specific way that 
visual cortex is analyzing the information and neural models explaining such 
illusions exist. The same image may lead to different conscious experiences 
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(for example the Necker cube), depending on synchronization of groups of 
neurons in sensory cortices. Such illusions tell us a lot about consciousness 
(Dehaene 2014). 
The sensory experience is a reflection of incoming stimuli in the neural 
substrate, it is a physical process. Qualia result from internal interpretation 
of sensory cortex activation. What then could be received that the brain is 
not able to produce by itself? Conscious perception takes place at the level 
that prepares us for action. We do not react to wavelength of reflected 
light but see red apples as red in a way that is largely independent of the 
type of illumination (color constancy effect). Visual cortex transforms the 
signal from retina to brain areas closer to motor cortex, simplifying the 
decision process. Some stimuli create only weak activity in the brain and 
are not distinguished from the neural noise, therefore we do not notice 
them consciously (this is explained in psychophysics by the signal detection 
theory, Swets 1966). Strong stimuli may be ignored if attention is focused on 
something else, because sensory signals do not propagate beyond primary 
sensory cortices (Dehaene 2003). Attention prepares the brain to receive 
specific information (Gilbert & Sigman 2007), priming relevant cortices 
(neurons waiting for inputs are pre-activated, sending about 20 spikes per 
second), and the persistent signal reaches areas where it is accessible to 
motor and speech areas, allowing for verbal and non-verbal self-reflective 
conscious comments (Duch 2005). 
Scholastic philosophers could not imagine computing machinery that 
we have now, and the principles that allow for information processing in 
neuromorphic systems. Understanding of reasoning or thinking mechanisms 
also does not require additional mechanisms. Thoughts and feelings seem to 
arise from nowhere, but using various neuroimaging techniques we can now 
observe neural processes that are correlated with subjective experiences. We 
can recreate sounds and sights from analysis of brain signals, and even say 
what people were dreaming of (Horikawa et al. 2013). The winner-takes-all 
neural mechanism leaves for a short while just one dominant process while 
others compete with each other until one of them wins and is propagated in 
the global neural workspace, becoming a part of the stream of consciousness. 
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So what functions are left for the souls to perform? Willpower has been 
a subject of intensive research in recent years (Wegner 2002). It seems that 
the brain is preparing for various actions, and when preparation for selected 
motor activity becomes sufficiently strong other parts of the brain interpret 
it as the feeling of will. Our sense of agency is sometimes illusory. We may 
be acting but do not realize that we are – examples include ideomotor 
responses in ouija board movements used in spiritistic seances, facilitated 
communication, water divination and hypnotism. British neurologist William 
Carpenter already in 1852 described the muscular movement independent of 
conscious desires or emotions. The reverse situation is also possible: we may 
not be acting being convinced that we are. Subjects may be induced to believe 
that they have performed some actions, or that their actions are achieving 
far more than they in fact are (Wegner 2002). Conscious acts of will must 
arise from somewhere; otherwise there will be an infinite regress: to will 
to will to will … Although we may be convinced that our decisions are free, 
initiated by conscious self, stimulation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC) with magnetic pulses or electric currents may significantly change 
them. The feeling of intention to act has been invoked by direct stimulation 
of the parietal cortex (Desmurget et al. 2009). Also neuropharmacological 
manipulation may have strong influence on decisions (for example, using 
oxytocin in spray). Brain stimulation may even induce immoral behavior 
(Glimcher & Fehr 2003). The sense of agency and free will is generated by 
the brain as a result of external as well as intrinsic processes, not because 
of some signals received from souls. The only way to interpret our current 
knowledge about volitional processes is to assume that both conscious 
willing and action that follow or precede the feeling of will are the effects 
of a common unconscious brain processes (Hallet 2016). 
2.3. Animal minds
The unity of nature is manifested at many levels, from molecules, proteins, 
genes, signaling pathways, biochemical cycles, body and brain structures, 
common to most animals. Reward, fear, arousal, affective, social and cogni-
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tive functions in animals are simplified versions of human brain functions. 
Big apes have much smaller brains than humans but show high intelligence, 
including planning, symbolic communication, emotions and feelings, a form 
of justice and culture, imagery and experience of insights (de Waal 1996, 
2005), and even theory of mind (Krupenye et al. 2016). There is no doubt 
that animals are conscious of their environment and themselves. They 
possess minds, although with limited power of self-reflection. There is a clear 
correlation between brain complexity and powers of the intellect. Certainly 
in case of humans with much larger and complex brains new and more 
sophisticated functions should be expected. In particular development of 
language has enabled civilization, cooperation on a large scale, accumulation 
of knowledge, and gave some people enough time to create philosophy, 
science and high culture. 
If human brain is a receiver then also animal brains should be receivers. 
A whole zoo of various souls would be needed. What kind of information they 
could receive? Animal brains are capable of generating quite sophisticated 
behavior. Many mammals (especially apes) need a long time to learn from 
their parents how to survive. They learn not only how to find food and shelter, 
but also learn social skills needed to collaborate with others. Their minds 
are created without the need for additional animation. Human brains create 
sophisticated minds that have greater intellectual powers due to the more 
complex brains, but this qualitative difference does not require completely 
new mechanisms that brains could not provide. 
2.4. Personal identity
People are not conscious during deep sleep, in anesthesia or coma, and their 
ability to think and have mental experiences is impoverished in various 
disorders of consciousness and cognitive impairments. At the late stage 
of Alzheimer disease people lose the ability to recognize themselves and 
their family members, lose most of their intellectual powers. There is no 
rational soul left in them, although biological processes may still function 
for some time. Is it possible that their souls are conscious somewhere else? 
Does such concept make sense? 
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If I do not know about my soul’s conscious experience, how can this 
experience be called mine, be linked to my personal identity? Why should 
I care about it? Egyptians thought that everything that moves is alive. 
Shadow was considered to be a kind of independent entity, capable of 
independent life, because shadow moves. Should I care about my shadow? 
I am rather concerned about the neurodynamics of my brain, because 
any neurological damage may bring a lot of suffering. Although I cannot 
observe most processes that go on in my brain I know that if some of them 
stop working I will lose specific abilities, or will fall into coma. My personal 
identity is linked to my whole organism. I can identify with my brain and 
my body. I am conscious of using my fingers typing this sentence. Fingers 
are also a part of me at mental level, they allow me to function in a way 
I would not be able without them.
After heart transplantation more blood goes to the brain, neural 
networks function in a different way, and the stream of consciousness 
generated by brain activity becomes different. New thought associations 
may spontaneously arise, personal identity may be disrupted (Mauthner 
et al. 2015). If blood does not reach some parts of the brain, as it happens 
rather frequently in case of ischemic stroke, some functions are lost. Brain 
damage leads to specific impairments of cognition. Neuropsychology knows 
many cases of strange phenomena that change self-awareness, such as the 
feeling of phantom limbs, illusion of the third hand, autoscopic phenomena 
(illusions of leaving one’s own body), various agnosias, including autop-
agnosia (body-image agnosia), or anosognosia or denial of existence of quite 
obvious disability (Morgan & Ricker 2008). One brain may support a coherent 
network of various behaviors that define personality, and sometimes several 
networks may coexist, manifesting as multiple personalities, or alternative 
“selves”. Million voices compete for conscious attention, trying to win control 
over global brain dynamics. Wrong brain wiring leads to abnormal behavior, 
for example distorted interpretation of pain signals (body dysmorphia, 
masochism), or pleasure from observed reactions to pain (sadism). A tumor 
in the brain may change normal people into pedophiles. Personality traits 
show significant variance around average values. Psychopaths are unable 
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to feel empathy, and some people suffer from hyper-empathy, neglecting 
their own needs. Damage to prefrontal cortex frequently leads to acquired 
sociopathy, typical for affective/impulsive criminals. Damage to amygdala 
may lead to poor empathy, low fear, typical for psychopathic emotionless 
criminals. About 25% of all imprisoned in the USA belong to these two 
categories. Their ability for self-control is reduced because the reward system 
in their brain is not functioning properly. The field of moral neuroscience 
is rapidly growing (Liao 2016).
Such phenomena are explained by neural information processing in the 
brain and cannot be explained by reception of mind. This is simply what 
one should expect from a complex large brain dynamics. The damage to the 
receiver may only stop the reception, but will not change the content, create 
new associations or feelings. Neuropsychology and psychiatry shows that 
the content depends on brain processes and depends on local information 
processing. How can an illusion of the phantom limbs or the third hand 
be explained by reception errors? Or how can deep brain stimulation help 
in severe depression cases? Putative mechanisms responsible for such 
phenomena provide explanations that are now experimentally tested. 
In psychology Self is understood as cognitive and affective representa-
tions of one’s identity. Therefore Self has many aspects, it is not a unified 
entity. Experiments show that reaction to self-referential verbal, spatial, 
emotional and face recognition stimuli, when the task is to distinguish self 
from others, activates a whole network of cortical midline structures. These 
structures are placed deeper in the brain and therefore better protected 
from mechanical injuries. They link the surface of the cortex and limbic/
brain stem structures (Northoff et al. 2006). 
Normal conscious experience requires activity that is both distributed 
over many local subnetworks, and integrated over most of the brain. It cannot 
be localized in one brain area. A complex dynamics of the whole neural 
system is involved in such processes. PET and fMRI studies show brain 
activity in normal awake subjects. Similar activity is seen in completely 
paralyzed locked-in subjects. Reduced neural activity is observed during 
anesthesia, disintegrated local activity persists in minimal consciousness 
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states, and almost no activity is left in vegetative states of consciousness. 
Various mathematical measures are derived from brain signals to estimate the 
level of consciousness. Complexity of the structure is not sufficient by itself: 
cerebellum contains 80% of all neurons in the brain, but it’s neural networks 
do not have sufficiently diverse structures to support various functions 
aspects of conscious information processing (selective attention, access to 
sensory and associative cortices implementing various forms of memory). 
What can the concept of soul add to understanding of my personal 
identity? Suppose that some information about my Self could be preserved 
after the death of the body. Will using this information to restart conscious 
processes in a robot, or some resurrected body, or many identical copies 
of my brain and body, constitute me as the same person? Information by 
itself is not sufficient to create mind, but the same information embodied in 
identical physical system should duplicate all mental processes. Cloning the 
whole person should then create many identical selves, each feeling to be 
genuine but separate from others. They may think and feel like me but will 
not be me. This is a strange question, discussed in length by Hofstadter and 
Dennett (2001). Disembodied mind in some other world does not subsume 
my Self. Consciousness that is not connected to my Self cannot be mine. 
2.5. Artificial Intelligence and the mechanics of cognition
Suppose that souls are indeed necessary to create intellect. Attempts 
to develop systems that think and perform similar functions as brains 
should then fail. Alan Turing has discussed this idea as one of possible 
objections against the possibility of building thinking machines, calling it 
a theological objection: machines have no souls, so they may not be able 
to think. He himself did not take this argument seriously, believing that 
computers should be able to pass intelligence test. What was only a belief 
in 1950 becomes reality in our times. Although logical approach to artificial 
intelligence, based on discrete symbols, failed to solve many AI problems 
hardware advances (speed and memory capacity) combined with new search 
and pattern-based algorithms gave spectacular results. In 1995 Chinook 
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checkers program won 6:0 with world champion dr Tinsley, in 1997 Deep 
Blue won with Gary Kasparov in chess, and in 2011 IBM Watson won in 
Jeopardy with two best players in the history of this game. Although chess 
and checkers are board games with simple rules Jeopardy required very broad 
knowledge and some understanding of the questions asked. For a while it 
seemed that the strategic game of Go will be beyond machine reach for 
a long time, but in early 2016 Google AlphaGo won with the world champion 
Lee Sedol 4:1. This program is based on deep pattern analysis, not on the 
extensive search used by the computer chess programs. Recognition of 
faces and image analysis is already done in a better way by machines than 
humans. Soon driving vehicles of all sorts will also be left to computerized 
systems. The key to all this progress is machine learning. 
Even quite simple parallel distributed processing systems, inspired by 
neural networks, have many properties characteristic of biological memory. 
Neural associative memories do not store information in localized places. 
Information is spread in connections between many units representing 
neurons. Distinct patterns of activity of these elements that persist for 
at least a short time represent memory traces, and transitions between 
them generate chains of thoughts. Memory in such models is retrieved 
from various cues (is content-addressable) and has associative character, 
linking related memory patterns. Errors that people make in memory tests, 
as well as their reaction times, may be replicated by associative memory 
models. Various forms of amnesia and memory related phenomena can 
be understood using neural modeling. Reward-based learning modifies 
network structure to reflect environmental events, creating internal model 
of objects and events encountered in the world. Computational models help 
to understand neuropsychological syndromes, psychiatric dysfunctions and 
cognitive aspects of neurological problems. 
Computers are already better than brains in many applications that 
require thinking. In 2015 a laboratory based on robotic platform controlled 
by AI software discovered genetic and signal pathways responsible for 
regeneration of flatworm bodies, automatically forming hypothesis and 
performing experiments to verify them. Many attempts to create software 
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for brain-inspired cognitive architectures (BICA) are under way, and robots 
controlled by such software are being built, from models of insects to serious 
NASA humanoid robots. Hector, insect robot that walks, plans its path, 
imagines alternative actions, has a number of higher-level mental states as 
a part of its control system (Cruse & Schilling 2015). “Inner mental states” of 
Hector include intentions and goal-directed behavior guiding robot actions 
(find food = find charging station). Body properties are coupled with the 
environment and used in internal model for planning actions (second-order 
embodiment). Emotions are inherent properties of behavior implemented in 
the control model based on recurrent neural networks (RNN). “Depending 
on its inner mental state, the system may adopt quick, but risky solutions, 
[… or] take its time to search for a safer solution” (Cruse & Schilling 2015). 
Is there a natural limit to the powers of artificial intellect? Although 
existing solutions are in some respects far behind biological brains great 
progress in building hardware neuromorphic system has been made. The 
large consortium called “Synapse” led by IBM has announced in 2015 a new 
neuromorphic chip called TrueNorth. Each such chip contains over 5 billion 
transistors that implement one million artificial neurons and 250 mln 
synapses (adjustable connections). 16 chips are combined in a module that 
has 16 mln neurons with over 4 billion synapses, requiring only 2.5 Watt, 
very low power! Such systems may be scaled to the complexity comparable 
with the human brains. There is a chance that such hardware will allow 
for implementation of mental functions very similar to those of humans, 
although this has not yet been demonstrated. 
There are no good arguments against convergence of the neural mod-
eling process in the embodied robotic systems and brain-like structure to 
conscious artifacts (Duch 2005). Artificial minds of brain-like systems will 
have to claim qualia due to their construction. These qualia, comments on 
physically existing persistent internal dynamical states, may be as real in 
artificial systems as they are in our brains. NOMADs (neurally organized 
mobile adaptive device) brain-based devices are intentional robots endowed 
with simple instincts, learning from their own experience in simple environ-
ments, showing animal-like behavior (Edelman 2006). We may soon have 
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more complex robots of this kind that will be aware of their environment, 
learning all skills needed for survival, including self-reflection. It should 
be possible to create artificial intellect that will surpass human abilities in 
most if not all respects. Advances in artificial intelligence, nanotechnology 
and neuromorphic chips point the way to construction of robots that will 
describe their inner states in mental terms. At some point we will have to 
acknowledge that they are conscious machines, even though their minds 
will differ from human minds. Essential features of being conscious, such 
as mental representation of the world, including construction of self, ability 
to comment on the flow of images in the brain, intellectual powers, are all 
within reach of technology. Psychopaths are conscious, therefore emotional 
reactions are not necessary to claim consciousness. 
Artificial intelligence has not created yet conscious artefacts. Neverthe-
less, technology has reached the point in which construction of artificial 
systems based on neuromorphic chips may help to find empirical answers 
to questions about the nature of consciousness. It would be quite surprising 
to discover that certain functions of human mind could not be implemented 
in artificial intelligence systems because souls communicate only with 
biological brains. 
3. Matter, form and information
Claiming that brain is a receiver of consciousness is equivalent to claiming 
that we have no idea how it works. This is simply ignorance, because we do 
know a lot about mechanics of brain processes, and know how to implement 
some of these mechanisms in artificial systems. The dualistic concept of 
soul is untenable for many reasons, some of which have been presented 
above. Connection of disembodied entities to material world has always been 
problematic. The hylomorphic understanding of mind in philosophy does not 
suffer from such problems. Mind may be understood as the specific form of 
highly organized matter that enables conscious processing of information. 
However, the concept of form has to be extended to account for dynamical 
nature of cognition. 
5(2)/2017 191
W H Y M I N D S CA N N OT B E R E C E I V E D, B U T A R E C R E AT E D B Y B RA I N S
3.1. Dynamical forms
Matter is a form of energy, as we know from physics. Spatial form of matter 
carries information in its structure, giving matter specific properties. At the 
microscopic level spatial distances are very small and the time intervals are 
very short, everything is moving very fast. At larger scales changes are slow, 
therefore a kind of reification, symbolic description based on quantization 
of the phenomena, becomes possible. Time scale for changes of mental 
processes (perceptions, thoughts), and processes changing brain structure 
(learning, aging) allow for distinction between static and dynamical forms. 
Form of the brain includes connectivity, neuronal structures, bio-
chemistry, signaling pathways, genetics. The concept of form may be thus 
another word to describe structural phenotype that involves many levels of 
description. However, brains have more subtle dynamical form that rapidly 
changes in time and is the basis of mental states and behavioral functions. 
This dynamical form is observed in functional neuroimaging (fMRI), while 
anatomical form is observed using simpler structural imaging techniques. 
Computers may run infinite number of different programs that support quite 
different functionality. Brains that have the same physical form, structure 
of connections and properties of neurons, may support many functional, 
neurodynamical states. Each mental event – thought, feeling, intention – 
changes this dynamical structure without changing the form of physical brain 
structures in a perceivable way. Of course at molecular level every cell changes 
in every moment, but at the macroscopic level these changes are negligible. 
The patterns of electrical activity of neurons are the dynamic form of 
matter, carrying information. John Locke defined consciousness as “the per-
ception of what passes in a man’s own mind” (Locke 1975, II.i.19: 115). Some 
patterns are interpreted as perception of sensory stimuli and understood as 
external objects and events. Some patterns result from memory recall, and 
are understood as imagined. Some patterns are pointers to symbols, with 
phonological representation as motor commands that produce sounds. Yet 
another patterns are behavioral, motor commands leading to intentional 
actions. It all depends which brain structures are activated, how sensory, 
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motor, associative memory and executive areas are activated. Patterns of 
brain activity are recognized by the brain itself, and associated with some 
form of imagery: visual, auditory (thoughts, words) or motor (actions). 
Good examples of dynamical forms are found at the molecular level. 
The C25H52 molecule has 25 carbons and 52 hydrogens, but this matter may 
be arranged in about 36 million of different spatial forms, or isomers. Each 
spatial structure may be in many different dynamical states (electronic, 
vibrational and rotational excited states), most of which are stable only for 
a very short time. Each dynamical state has different properties, such as 
probability of interactions with other molecules or interactions with light, 
responsible for the absorption and emission spectra. Small molecules at 
quantum level may assume many discrete dynamical forms, influencing 
structural form to various degrees. For larger molecules or for highly excited 
states there are so many dynamical forms that differ in negligible way that 
in practice there is a continuum of possible forms. 
Conscious processes are thus perception of dynamical forms, or synchro-
nous activations, that arise in the brain. Scientists search for neural correlates 
of conscious processes (Koch et al. 2016), trying to characterize which 
patterns are perceived as conscious and which decay unnoticed. Learning 
processes change physical form, change brain connections and thus change 
the patterns that neurodynamics may activate. Studying such processes tells 
us which mental states (dynamical forms) are potentially accessible for the 
brains that have specific structure, depending on the individual connectome 
and other factors (neural properties, in particular ion channel types and their 
distribution, neurotransmitter release and many other factors). 
While the current ideas in neuroscience can be linked with ancient 
hylomorphic understanding of the mind-body relations it will not help us 
to understand mental processes. Memory, personality traits and all mental 
faculties that can influence behavior are in a dormant, potentially accessible 
state until sufficient energy in specific form becomes available, facilitating 
their contribution at a given moment to the actual neurodynamics of the 
brain. Decay of the brain connections, or lack of specific forms of energy that 
activates neurons, destroys the system. Unless detailed information about 
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the structure of the brain is stored this destruction is not reversible. Energy 
becomes dissipated in the form of heat, used in the decay processes, and 
information is lost. To prevent brain death after cardiac arrest temperature 
is decreased, and new resuscitation methods extend the time when the brain 
may be brought to life (currently this period is shorter than an hour). If the 
neural structure is not significantly damaged the brain may be “restarted” 
and the mind comes back. Freezing the whole body to -80 C or lower 
temperatures preserves the tissues. Cryoconservation techniques are not 
yet reversible, and it is not clear if hundreds of deeply frozen people will 
ever be able to come to life thanks to medical procedures. 
Conclusions
Hylomorphism regards every physical object as a compound of matter 
and form. Form may be understood as specific organization of matter. 
Information defining structure is not material, information does not occupy 
space. Form in the brain has structural as well as dynamical aspects. While 
structural aspects define potentially accessible brain states dynamic aspects 
are responsible for actual, active states that are experienced as various 
mental phenomena. Dynamical form (neurodynamics) does not change 
brain structure; it defines a new level of description. At this level dynamical 
forms are identical to mental events. Techniques used in brain-computer 
interfaces, reading brain intentions, thoughts or imagery, are basically 
converting dynamical forms into sounds and images that other people may 
understand through normal sensory perception. Information is preserved, 
only representation is changed. From this point of view the gap between 
physical and mental processes is illusory. 
Mental processes are supported by the brain that provides a substrate in 
which what is potentially possible may be actualized and become conscious 
experience. Dynamical form is an information process that changes the state 
of matter, but not the matter itself. Mind is thus truly non-materialistic, 
based on dynamical forms that exist only potentially, and is actualized by 
neurodynamics in a way that depends on many circumstances, including 
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personal history. Self-observation of dynamical forms creates the spotlight 
of consciousness (Baars 1997). 
Summarizing arguments presented above that the brain creates rather 
receives mind or conscious experience:
1. All functions proposed for souls have found natural explanations, 
so this concept has absent referent. Rational soul is equivalent to 
mind or intellect. 
2. Mind is not monolithic, but a collection of many specialized func-
tions. Mind received by the brain is not an intelligible concept. 
3. Consciousness is not a thing that can be received, but a process that 
depends on the brain neurodynamics, parts of the brain comment-
ing on states of other parts. 
4. Detached minds would have to know all about this world to be able 
to transmit anything relevant to our activity and experience. 
5. Even simple animal behavior is based on very complex physical 
processes; biological organisms are incredibly complex for a good 
reason. 
6. Complex conscious experience must be supported by distinct pat-
terns for different mental states, and that requires sufficiently 
complex substrate. 
7. Brains are the most complex substrates in the known universe; 
such complexity is necessary for creation of mental states. Trans-
mitter should be more complex than receiver. 
8. Brains work hard solving problems; receivers should not require 
more energy. 
9. Animal brains are similar to human and complexity of animal 
minds (social life, behavior, memory, problem solving) grows with 
the complexity of their brains, so their brains should also work as 
receivers.
10. Damages to the specific brain areas lead to strange neuropsycho-
logical syndromes, showing how experience is constructed by the 
brain. Auditory and visual illusions arise due to the specific con-
struction of sensory cortices. 
5(2)/2017 195
W H Y M I N D S CA N N OT B E R E C E I V E D, B U T A R E C R E AT E D B Y B RA I N S
11. Personal identification is based on memory and brain/body pro-
cesses, it is also changing from infancy to the old age; one cannot 
identify with detached mind that is received. 
12. The structure of connections and neural properties determines 
types of personality; it cannot depend on something received. 
13. Some aspects of the neural processes responsible for perception, 
decision making and planning are already known and can be cap-
tured in artificial intelligence software. 
Although I have focused here on arguments showing how brains create 
minds it should be remembered that only a coarse structure of the brain is 
created by biological factors (genetic, epigenetic, developmental processes). 
A small number of neural connections in the brain of newborns develops 
in the span of a few years through interactions with the external world 
into a million billion connections, internalizing the knowledge about the 
world, enabling perception and thinking. Brains can change themselves 
even in the older age (Doidge 2007) due to neuroplasticity. What we see, 
hear, experience, think changes brain structure all the time. Psychology 
describes limitations of mental processes that brains of particular type are 
able to carry. Research on psychotherapy and neuroplasticity explores the 
ways that mental processes influence brain structures (Cozolino 2010). 
Therefore it may also be said that minds create brains through top-down 
causality. This position has been central to non-reductive physicalism of 
Nancy Murphy (2006), who has also asked what is left for a soul to do? 
The concept of a dynamical form presented here is indeed an emergent 
phenomenon. Although it needs material substrate it cannot be reduced 
to physical reality. 
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